State Representation and Service Delivery in Sierra Leone

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> High-Level Conversation on Social Cohesion Freetown, April 5, 2023

Motivation

- In a democratic context, people are supposed to be provided with public services according to their **needs**.
- But many democracies have mechanisms which create inequity in the distribution of services.
 - Political parties tend to favor their "core supporters" above the supporters of opposition parties.
 - Politics may feature various types of clientelism and patronage which takes the form of the distribution of targeted favors (jobs, contracts) at the expense of the provision of public services which have broad impacts.
 - More specific social connections between constituents and policymakers may be a way for people to **benefit differentially**, or expect to benefit differentially, from public policy.
- In this research we particularly investigate this last channel. There seems to be a widespread belief in Sierra Leone that being represented at a high level in the state bring substantial benefits.
- Does it?


Data


- We used four rounds of the SL Afrobarometer Survey 2012, 2015, 2018, and 2020 for this analysis.
- We constructed public services scores which are determined by whether individual respondents interviewed during the Afrobarometer had access to an electricity grid, piped water system, a sewage system, a school, and/or a health clinic in their immediate enumeration area.
- Individual public good scores run from 0-1 and from these we constructed and aggregate score which runs from 0-5 (0 you don't have access to any of these services, 5 you have access to all of them).
- To measure representation in the state for a particularly chieftaincy we collected information on public appointments: heads of ministries, departments and agencies, parliament and the judiciary, between 2008 and 2019 (so starting with appointments made under Koroma and ending with Bio) and associated each person with their chieftaincy of birth.

Inequitable Representation


- Freetown (Western Area) understandably has the most public appointments 57.
- Bombali Sebora (Makeni) 23.
- Maforki (Port Loko)– 18.
- Sanda Tendaran (Bombali) 12.
- Tonko Limba (Kambia) 12.
- Yoni (Tonkolili) 12.
- Nongowa (Kenema) 10.
- Luawa (Kailahun) 9.
- 81 chieftaincies **0**.


Inequitable political representation and service provision







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








Findings


- In an ideal world there should be no relationship between the representation of a chieftaincy in the state and service provision in that chieftaincy.
- In a "really existing democracy" world, one might hypothesize a positive relationship more appointments better services.
- What we find is something more interesting
 - Being represented in the state does generate better service provision **but only** if that representation is sufficiently high.
 - Having low levels of representation, say 1-2 ministers, **is worse** than having **no appointments** at all.








School by Representation Level (Coefficient Plot)






Interpretation

- We interpret this as saying that chieftaincies that lack representation are better at organizing themselves to provide services.
- Once you get some representation you become **dependent** on the government, but the government does not deliver.
- In order to receive services, you have to have **sufficiently high** representation, maybe 5 or more appointments.
- But in our data, there are 81 chieftaincies that have never been represented in the state, 61 that have 1-2 appointments, 12 that have 3-4 positions, and a mere 9 that have 5 or more appointments.
- Hence in the most plausible scenario, only 9 chieftaincies are better off in terms of service provision from this way of deciding on policy. 61 are actually worse off than if they had had no representation at all.
- This system creates large inequities and is self-defeating for most Sierra Leoneans.

Research in Practice: Citizen's Online Scorecard: The Governance & Accountability Tracker



Changing the Political Equilibrum – Citizens demand leadership reform in the Citizens Manifesto

Citizens demand for political parties to commit to reform

- 1. In the 1st yr. introduce traffic light and reduce police on the street
- 2. The next government to evenly distribute appointments to regions. Not below 15% and above 30% per region
- 3. Pay executives of parliamentary parties from the consolidated fund

Areas citizens commit to support the next administration

- 1. Stop putting undue pressure on judges, police magistrates, EMBs and allow the law to take its course
- 2. Stop paying bribes to public officials like police, teachers, health workers and tax officials
- 3. Stop begging MPs and politicians for money and personal gifts